1) Introduction
In this paper we analyse how income distribution, intellectual property rights (IPRs), and other regulatory policies, such as minimum quality standards, determine pricing strategies in a dynamic context, in which a single firm (referred to as "the monopolist") periodically introduces new generations or upgrades of a durable good.
In point of fact, several durable goods are subject to periodic quality improvements, some of them, like cellular phones or digital cameras, at impressive and ever increasing speeds. When consumers are simplistically assumed to be homogeneous, a single firm producing the state-of-the-art product may charge a price sufficiently low so as to eliminate from the market all older generations of the same product 1 . However, when consumers have different income levels or different valuations of quality improvements, multiple quality levels can sell simultaneously in the market.
In this circumstance, time and quality are different elements that might be used by a monopolist to discriminate between consumers with different valuations/income levels. Even if the durable good came in a single quality, the monopolist could first charge a high price and sell the durable to "rich" or high-valuation consumers who have more to loose if they delayed their purchase.
Of course this depends on the monopolist being able to commit not to change the price of its single quality product too fast in pursuit of adding up revenue from sales to poor consumers. This is referred to in the literature as "the commitment problem" or "the firm's time inconsistency problem" and is examined by Inderst (2003) . In his setup the monopolist makes only one sale of one unit of the durable good to each consumer, that is, the consumer buys the durable good only once in his lifetime. Time may elapse until the whole market is cleared (all consumers have acquired the durable good and the game ends). When the possibility of selling two different qualities at the same time enters the picture, a monopolist without commitment power will typically clear the whole market immediately, selling a top quality good to high-valuation consumers and a lower quality one to lowvaluation consumers, thus "committing" not to make a more attractive offer to these latter in the future.
In our setup, quite differently, a monopolist with full commitment ability sells successive generations of the same durable good to each consumer in his (infinite) lifetime. This dramatically changes the relationship between quality discrimination and monopoly power: the prospect that the present durable good generation will be available in the market at a lower price in the future (when poor consumers make their purchases under discrimination) induces rich consumers to wait or displace their whole consumption program, so that the 3 monopolist must charge a lower price if he intends to prevent this waiting behaviour from high income consumers.
Thence a trade-off emerges that was not present in Inderst (2003) : by not resorting to quality discrimination the monopolist can charge high prices on rich consumers' purchases but poor consumers' waiting time (or "replacement period") will be longer. A long replacement period, besides meaning a smaller overall number of purchases in a consumer's lifetime, also brings along with it a high probability of imitation, in which event the sale of one of the generations by the monopolist is skipped.
This latter trade-off can be more relaxed the older are the generations the monopolist is free to sell (the price to rich consumers under quality discrimination approaches the price to rich consumers under simple time discrimination or "screening"). The limit to how old generations can be put for sale is determined by competition/imitation or by a regulatory policy setting "minimum quality standards" as examined by Glass (2001) .
Glass ' (2001) setup is one in which the good that is innovated/upgraded is non-durable, and therefore consumers must buy some quantity every period. Successive generations of this non-durable become available over time in a quality ladder fashion, that is, there is a single constant rate of innovation and successful innovators are able to sell the state-of-the-art generation. With two consumers types (with different valuations) the oldest generation that may sell in equilibrium is the immediately pre-state-of-arts. Basically, there are two different kinds of equilibrium, depending on consumers types' weights in population: in a "separation equilibrium" (corresponding to quality discrimination), whenever there is an innovation, the high-valuation consumers switch to the brand-new generation paying a high price and low-valuation consumers switch to what was until now the state-of-the-art generation paying a lower price. In a "pooling equilibrium" both consumers' types pay the same price and only the state-of-arts generation sells. A common feature of both equilibria is that high and low valuation consumers replace their generations at the same rate, which is the model's innovation rate.
In our model, in contrast, income distribution and population parameters may induce equilibria (pricing strategies) in which both rich and poor consumers replace their generations at the same pace or in which rich consumers have a higher replacement frequency. Of course, in relation to Glass (2001) we loose one degree of generality: in our setup the rate of innovation is exogenous, and we normalise time units so that this rate is one innovation per period.
1.1) motivation: empirical evidences from the Brazilian economy
In the last 15 years or so, Brazil witnessed a considerable reduction in poverty, with millions of people entering the "middle class". This evolution shows up when we compare the [2002] [2003] Bearing this in mind, the first piece of evidence we offer is the correlation between per capita income and price paid (at the household level) for each durable good in our POF subsample 3 (see appendix 1 and figure 1 below). Excluding durable goods for which there were only 2 households making an acquisition (which thus rendered a correlation equal to -1 ou +1), we found a positive, average (cross goods) correlation of 0.20, being that for 54 out of 65 durable goods the correlation is positive. Using consumer theory's terminology, this simply reflects the well known fact that richer consumers have a higher "reservation price". The second piece of evidence we offer relates measures of income and price variability: for each durable good in POF's sample, we construct an index of income variability ≡ income mean deviation / average income 4 of the households which acquired the good; and an analogous index of price variability ≡ price mean deviation / average price. And then, considering the same 65 durable goods as before, we find a positive, 0.15 cross-good correlation between our income and price variability indexes. (see appendix 1.2 and figure 2 below) Although this second evidence adds information to the first evidence we showed (positive correlation between per capita income and price), as such this is not a surprising result: given the first evidence, we may expect that those goods or markets with a greater price variability "accommodate" a wider range of buyers' income levels. Also, we may expect it to emerge under many different product market competition models, ranging from monopoly to perfect competition, provided that we have many distinct goods, "varieties" or "vintages" under each of the 65 durable headlines such as "colour TV".
The third piece of evidence we offer is far more interesting. It relates price variability and the relative frequency with which different income groups acquire new durables. In TABLE 1 below, all households in POF's sample are split into two groups of the same size: the "rich" households being those with per capita income greater than the medium p.c. income, and the "poor" households being the other half. The figures in the fifth column (labeled "relfrequency") show the ratio of the share of rich households to the share of poor 6 households that bought each durable good in the year of the survey 5 . Since all the figures are bigger than one, POF data uncover the stylized fact that poor consumers tend to have a smaller replacement frequency of durable goods than rich ones. The last column is our index of price variability, defined above. Further restricting the former list of 65 goods (for which there were more than 2 buyers) so that there are now at least one "rich" and one "poor" household with non-zero entries, we are left with 58 goods, for which we find a negative correlation of ─ .21 between price variability and "relfrequency" (the relative shares of rich and poor consumers that made an acquisition during the year 2008-2009). So it seems to be the case that, for durable goods which are not very price-differentiated, rich consumers make purchases with a much bigger frequency than poor consumers. Conversely, for durable goods which are very pricedifferentiated, poor consumers make acquisitions with almost the same frequency as rich consumers. Now, most of durable goods in the survey (POF) are home appliances, a sector marked by considerable market power in the Brazilian economy 6 . And assuming that a high price variability must reflect the fact that a durable good is being sold in many different models (ranging from the simplest to the most sophisticated) and/or "generations" (from the stateof-the-art to the almost obsolete), then this third piece of evidence or "stylized fact" from Brazilian POF strongly suggests the kind of strategic monopolistic behavior (quality and time discrimination) discussed in section 1 above. The model we develop next is intended to rationalize this stylized fact and, incidentally, also the second piece of evidence relating income and price variability. 
1.3) paper organisation:
In section 2 we describe consumers' behaviour, showing how reservation prices for durable-goods acquisitions and frequencies of generation renewals depend on income. In section 3 we present the two basic dynamic pricing strategies: non-discrimination and discrimination. In section 4 we show how the choice between non-discrimination and discrimination by the monopolist depends on income distribution, minimum quality standards and IPRs. Section 5 concludes. In the APPENDIX we present data from the last Brazilian POF (household budget survey), which has motivated our modelling. 
2) Consumers' behaviour
The infinite time functional is:
The instantaneous utility is:
in which 1 is the quantity of durable good q t is the quality of the durable good available for the consumer at time t y t is the quantity of non-durable good available at time t (proxy for income) p is the the durable's price measured in units of non-durable z t = 0 if the consumer doesn't purchase a new generation of durable at time t z t = 1 if the consumer purchases a new generation of durable at time t
If we assume that purchasing the new generation of durable good is not a big burden on the consumer's budget (income), then we can 1 st order approximate (2) as 
By (4) we see that, given p and y , the consumer will be willing to buy a new durable generation at time T, that is,
, when the durable's generation she/he possesses at
is big enough. On the other hand, given p and
, the consumer will be willing to buy a new durable generation at time T when her/his income y is big.
Let's assume for the moment that "rich" consumers choose replacing their durable's generation every period 8 , what amounts to an improvement of λ times in the durable's quality every period. The condition for a rich consumer to do so is:
,in which y r is the rich consumer's income. Expression (5) gives an upper bound to p assuming rich consumers change the durable's generation every period, and is therefore obtained from (4) with 1
Let us analyse now the "poor" consumer's problem: inspection of (3) above shows that if it paid-off buying a new generation at time t = 1, then it would pay-off changing the durable's generation every period, since the gain from jumping one generation up is constant and equal to λ ln = du . So we define the "waiting time" or "replacement period" of the poor consumer as
, in which y p is the poor consumer's income. If time were continuous, or for a small λ, we would have
In the above equality, the left side is the gain from changing the durable's generation; the right side is the cost in terms of the utility of foregone non-durable consumption. Obviously,
and 0 > dp dr p , that is, the poorer the consumer is, the longer it takes for her/him to replace her/his durable's generation. And a price reduction leads the poor consumer to increasing her/his replacement frequency.
From (5) and (6') comes 
That is, if the price charged on new generations is such that rich consumers replace their generations every period, then the time poor consumers wait to do so is not greater than the ratio between income levels.
3) Dynamic pricing strategies
3.1) Non-discrimination
Recall we assumed that innovation is a process with memory so that a single firm launches all new generations in the durable good market. The simplest pricing strategy this monopolist can use is "non-discrimination", which here means that one generation of the durable good is sold for a single price over time and no two different generations are for sale at the same time. It may be the case that poor consumers buy new generations with a smaller frequency, but whenever they make their purchases they are taking the same product rich consumers take.
If the single price under "non-discrimination" were just sufficient for the poor to buy the new generation at every period
,then by (6') we would have r p = 1. But this is only one possibility. More generally, consider
, then by (6') we have . When the price is multiplied by ρ, the purchasing frequency is divided by ρ, but since the future is discounted by a factor β < 1 -see expression (1) above -this amounts to reducing the present value of the revenues (profits) stream of the monopolist.
So the price under "non discrimination" will be given by ( 9.i ) and the high income consumer will buy a new generation every period. In order to calculate monopolist's revenues, we still have to consider population parameters and the possibility of imitation:
Call ≡ r n number of rich consumers and ≡ p n number of poor consumers 13 We already know that γ = p r . Assume also that n p is big enough so that poor consumers' purchases are uniformly distributed over time. In this case, the expected number of poor consumers changing their durable's generation in a one period span of time is γ p n . Obviously, the number of rich consumers changing their durable's generation in a one period span of time is n r . Now imitation is conceived of as a process by which other firms may become able to produce state-of-the-art generations with probability i from the very moment those new generations become available in the market. Imitation is assumed to be a memoryless process in the sense that expertise is not cumulative, that is, if I fail to imitate generation t at time t, my probability of imitating generation t at time t + 1 is i, the same as my probability of imitating generation t + 1 at time t + 1. If there are many rival imitative firms engaged in price competition, then the only Nash equilibrium in imitation strategies will be that only the state-of-the-art generation is targeted by imitators. We also assume that information flows freely and instantaneously inside the imitators' community, so that whenever imitation is successful, all imitators become able to produce 10 . Assuming for simplicity that imitation and production costs are zero, Bertrand competition on the part of successful imitators will drive the price to zero, causing the monopolist a total loss.
Our innovative monopolist will realise its sales only if imitation fails, what happens with probability (1 -i) for rich consumers and probability (1 -i) γ for poor consumers, so that its expected revenue per period is ( )
Expression (10) reveals a trade-off present in pricing decisions when there is no discrimination: on the one hand, reducing γ is the same as reducing the new generation's price, leading to smaller revenues per period from sales to rich consumers while leaving sales to poor consumers unaltered 11 ; on the other hand, reducing γ leads poor consumers to increasing their replacement frequency, 1 / r p , in a context where there is imitation and the bigger r p the more likely imitation will occur, thus increasing the expected value of sales revenues per period. One may regard the other pricing strategy, discrimination, as a means of relaxing this trade-off. 10 Put another way, imitators don't run independent projects, and i is already the aggregate probability of imitation.
11 Sales to poor consumers remain constant because if the price is reduced to, say, a half, then the number of poor consumers that in one period will replace their durables'generation is exactly doubled. This follows from the already known fact that
3.2) Discrimination
Consider a poor consumer willing to buy a new generation at time t. Using the same notation as above 12 ( 11 ) where p dp denotes the "low" price of a durable α generations old. This price is chosen by the monopolist so as to make the poor consumer to be willing to switch generations of the durable good every r pd − δ periods, where r pd is the time lag for the switching by the poor consumer should she/he face the "high" price p d :
So the fundamental feature of "dynamic price discrimination" is that the monopolist will induce low income consumers to buy a product that is already α generations old and to anticipate (δ periods) their purchases, shortening the period in between purchases, while high income consumers will keep buying the state-of-the-art product at every period. This implies that more than one generation of the (same) durable good are for sale in the market 13 . Typically, poor consumers pay the "low" price p dp for the old generation, and rich consumers pay the "high" price p d for the new generation.
It is worth noticing that α, the age (number of periods since introduction in the market) of the old generation product, does not enter expression ( 11 ) above. This is because in a "steady-state" in which poor consumers always buy durables that are already α generations old 14 , the only thing they care about is the size of the quality step they take, that is, (r pd − δ ) · ln λ . 12 See expression (4) above. 
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Indifference towards α is not true, however, for rich consumers − they face the ex ante choice between buying the durable's generation t at time t, paying p d for that, or buying generation t at time t + α paying only p dp . When the probability of imitation is properly taken into account, this amounts to comparing ( ) ( 12 ) Expression ( 12 ) is written as the condition for a rich consumer to be willing to buy generation t at time t, paying p d for that, rather than buying generation t at time t + α paying only p dp . The left side can be viewed as the expected gain from not waiting and the right side as the expected gain from waiting, although the rich consumer is in both cases replacing generations every period. For the inequality ≥ above to hold, p d cannot be too much bigger than p dp ; for although the gain from waiting is time discounted (by a factor α β ), waiting brings about a bigger probability of imitation, in which case the consumer doesn't pay anything for a new generation. 15 If prices are such that ( 12 ) above holds with equality, that is rich consumers are indifferent between waiting and not waiting, we can solve it for p dp as a function of Now we are ready to solve for the endogenous variables p dp , p d and r pd − δ : Using (11) with = , (6'') and (13) (2001) calls "minimum quality standards", when the government forbids sales of too old generations. The limit case is when the government allows only state-of-the-art generations to be sold in the market, in which case α = 0 and discrimination is impossible. When the quality standard is some positive integer α , the choice of α must befall on {1, 2, ..., α }.
In order to calculate the monopolist's expected revenue per period under discrimination, an expression analogous to (10) above, we first notice that a sale for rich consumers will be realised with probability (1-i), and for poor consumers with probability ( ) Using (14), (15) and (16) In expression (18), the monopolist takes as given the parameters and exogenous variables: λ, n r , n p , y r , y p , β, i and α . If α = 1, then discrimination can only take place with α = 1 and the only choice variable is δ, the number of periods the poor consumer's generation replacement is anticipated. This choice of δ is in turn constrained by: a lower bound δ = 0 − − − − since δ < 0 would mean that the monopolist charges p dp such that the poor consumer actually postpones her/his generation replacement relative to what she/he would do under p d , what in turn would imply p dp > p d , an absurd by definition of p dp and p d .
an upper bound we find by setting r pd − δ = 1 in expression (16) above − − − − after all, since we assume that new generations are launched at a rate 1 per period, the minimum a poor consumer can wait to replace her/his durable generation is the same as a rich consumer do, that is, 1 period. This upper bound is given by 
4) Income distribution and pricing strategies
Here we address two related questions: 1) Given parameters and exogenous variables'
values, which value of γ maximises V, the monopolist's expected revenue per period under non-discrimination, and which pair of values ( ) α δ , maximise V d , the monopolist's expected revenue per period under discrimination ? 2) Under which circumstances is the maximal V d > maximal V , so that discrimination is a dominant strategy? In particular, how does this depend on population parameters (n r , n p ), income inequality ( If the maximizer γ* is smaller than the value given by (24), we have maximal V d ' > maximal V' with a positive value for δ. Put another way, more loosely, when V' is maximised with a small enough γ value, we can be sure that discrimination is a better strategy. Inspecting expression (20) we see that this happens when s p , the share of poor consumers in population, is large and/or when the probability of imitation i is high. The intuition behind this result should be obvious to the reader. 17 However obvious, this result is already different from what we find in Glass (2001) : there she calls a "pooling equilibrium" a situation where both types of consumers pay the same price for a new (state-of-the-art) generation, that is, the same as "non-discrimination" here.
Well, in our model, except for the trivial cases when α = 0 or s r = 0, we will never observe a pooling equilibrium with
, that is, γ = 1 in expression (9) above; because we know that under these circumstances discrimination would be a better strategy. On the contrary, in Glass (2001) , owing to the classical quality ladder model's feature that the firms which produce the state-of-the-art and the pre-state-of-the-art generations are rival (not a single monopolist), the pooling equilibrium price is always given by the lowest evaluation in the market, that is, the poor consumer's evaluation.
In our model, if non-discrimination (pooling) prevails, then γ * is surely bigger than 1.
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This has another important consequence: r p , the poor consumers' replacement period, will always be > 1, since we know that r p = γ. Thus a stylised fact must be observed under nondiscrimination: poor consumers will have a smaller replacement frequency than rich consumers. With respect to the replacement frequency, how does discrimination look like? To answer this, we must go beyond the sufficient condition derived in (22) - (24) above.
Taking the first derivative of V d ' with respect to δ we get , which has an ambiguous signal. While taking the second derivative we get 
. 20 But substituting δ = 0 in expressions (14) and (15), we see that that means p d = p dp , that is, non-discrimination. So the conclusion is: if doing discrimination pays-off, then this is done with δ maximal, what in turn implies r pd − δ = 1, and poor consumers replace generations every period, like rich consumers do. When the monopolist is allowed to sell old enough stuff (α > > 0), then it maximises its profits by making poor consumers replace their generations with the greatest frequency possible. On the contrary, if α is small, so that the upper bound to δ is small, then the monopolist will resort to non-discrimination. 21 Also, the upper bound to δ is decreasing in the time factor β : When β is small (the interest rate is high) and the future is much discounted, discrimination is likely the best strategy 20 This last value comes from expression (19) above. 21 The reader will notice that in the text we are implicitly assuming first that the upper bound to δ is increasing in α, what, inspecting expression (19) we see it is true for y big enough. Second, and more important, we are assuming the monopolist will always choose α α = (maximal allowed) so as to choose the biggest δ and thus maximise Vd' . More formally, what must be considered in choosing α is
. Now we know that for all reasonable parameters values, the positive indirect effect because the monopolist can open a big wedge between a high p d and a low p dp without fearing that rich consumers will prefer waiting to buy old generations of the durable good.
Finally, the way how income inequality (y) affects the monopolist's strategy choice is a bit more complicated. Consider the sufficient condition derived above: By (19) the upper bound to δ is clearly increasing in y, while by (23) the difference V d ' − V' is increasing in δ, so that it might appear that the bigger is y the more it pays-off to discriminate. However, this reasoning holds only as long as the sufficient condition applies, that is, when V' is maximised with a small γ value, which in turn is not true for y too big. So typically the difference first increases with y (while the optimal non-discrimination price is based on the poor consumers'evaluation, that is, γ close to 1 ), but eventually it will fall below zero when y gets too big (so that poor consumers don't represent a big share of the market income and the optimal non-discrimination price is based on the rich consumers'evaluation).
This contrasts with Koh's (2006) striking result that, even when consumers and the monopolist have the same rate of discount, (intertemporal price) discrimination is always dominant over a constant price (non-discrimination), while in Stokey (1979) discrimination was always a dominated strategy. Koh's result is due to the realistic assumption that consumers face an intertemporal budget constraint, that is, they can borrow or lend money (non-durable good) over time. So although this is not the main focus of our paper, we are left with explaining a third possibility, namely, that each strategy (discrimination and nondiscrimination) may in turn be dominant. An exhaustive demonstration is beside the point here, but we may say that this implication of our model follows from the fact that the monopolist here is constrained by minimum quality standards (recall α above), so that it is not entirely free to choose how old are the generations it sells to poor consumers.
5) Conclusions
Recollecting the results we got, we may say that discrimination is likely to occur when income distribution is bad (high s p and high y) but poor consumers still represent a not negligible share of the economy's income (y cannot be too high); when IPRs are low (high probability of imitation i); and when the future is very much discounted (low β , what can be interpreted as a high interest rate). Another necessary condition for discrimination is that quality standards are absent or not too strict − more generally, we may say that discrimination is likely to be observed in markets where old generations/models sell at the same time that state-of-the-art ones. The pricing strategies (discrimination and nondiscrimination) influence the poor consumers' replacement frequency in different ways: under discrimination, poor consumers will have the same replacement frequency as rich consumers, while under non-discrimination poor consumers are expected to take more time to replace their durable good's generation.
To finish, there are two remarks we would like to make:
The first has to do with the impact of income distribution on welfare in our model. To illustrate this point, consider 3 "poor" consumers with identical incomes (as measured in terms of our model's nondurable good), but each living in a different economy, the economies being isolated from one another and each served by a monopolist like the one in our model: the first consumer lives in a place where almost everybody is poor and income inequality is low; the second guy lives in a place where the share of poor consumers is big and income inequality is high; the third lives in a place where the share of poor consumers is small and inequality is big. Then our model predicts that the first guy is better off than the second guy, who is better off than the third guy: the first guy may very well be replacing his durable's generation with a high frequency paying a low price; the second guy will pay a higher price but still enjoy a high replacement frequency; the third guy will pay an even higher price while having a low frequency.
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The second remark has to do with the conclusion we reached that discrimination is more likely to be the underlying phenomenon in markets where old generations/models sell at the same time that state-of-the-art ones. Maybe this helps explaining the fact observed in Brazilian POF (Household Budget Survey, see section 1.1) that while rich consumers replace their laptop computer models with much greater frequency than poorer consumers, both rich and poor consumers seem to be replacing their CD-roms with roughly the same frequency. Indeed, when we inspect what is for sale at those different markets, we see that practically only latest generations of laptop computers are fabricated, while many different vintages/models of CD-roms are being currently fabricated. Recall that in our model discrimination involves simultaneous fabrication/sales of different generations and that under discrimination both poor and rich consumers are expected to be replacing their generations with the same (maximal) frequency. Prices charged on the same good are expected to differ considerably, what seems to be the case for CD-roms when we take the price mean deviation divided by the average price in spot markets (our "price variability" measure). Under non-discrimination, on the contrary, only state-of-the-art durables sell, and poor consumers will be replacing their generations at a smaller pace. There is a single price charged on each good, what grossly seems to be the case for laptop computers, which have a much smaller price variability. 
